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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
nonlegalistic members of my family, male and female, and there has
resulted an ignoble scramble to see who would get it next. I recommend
it.
W. BARTON LEACH *
READINGS IN ADOPTION. Edited by I. Evelyn Smith.' New York:
Philosophical Library. 1963. Pp. xii, 532. $7.50.
Today, adoption of children is clearly recognized as part of the social
process- a continuing flow of interaction among people-in which a
child becomes a member of another family. The complexities of the
adoption process have increased and societal involvement has become
profound. From a simple, informal agreement transferring custody of a
child from his biological parents to others, adoption has become a highly
structured procedure in which a number of community institutions and
community decision makers assume critical roles.
Readings in Adoption, a collection of articles selected from profes-
sional journals and edited by Miss I. Evelyn Smith, gives some indica-
tion of the complexities of the adoption process. The editor has grouped
the essays under the following headings: "General Concepts and Basic
Philosophy of Adoption," "Adoption Services as Related to Natural
Parents," "Adoption Services as Related to the Child," "Adoption Ser-
vices as Related to Adoptive Families," and "Contribution of Other Pro-
fessions." A number of the essays are outdated, an important fact if
statistics and trends are to be considered. For example, in recent years
there has been a decrease in the ratio of qualified families to children
legally available for adoption. Until a few years ago there had been ten
or more families making application to adopt for every child legally avail-
able for adoption.2 Recent reports indicate a marked drop in adoption
applications and an increase in "adoptable" children, those children who
are easily placed. 3 These changes have had an important effect on the
adoption services discussed in the book and necessitate a reevaluation
of the views of the last decade, when almost all of the essays in the col-
lection were written. Interestingly, it is the editor's own material that is
the most current and provocative. In this review, I shall focus on two
major problems: removal of children from their biological parents and
placement of children with adoptive parents.
Miss Smith and other writers urge the early availability of children
for adoption. This is the generally accepted view. They suggest that the
earlier a child is removed from his biological family and placed with an
adoptive one, the more likely it is that the child will be fully integrated
* Story Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1 Consultant on Foster Care, Children's Bureau, United States Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare.2 See Brown, Adoption, in Socm WoRx YEAR Boox 85 (Kurtz ed. ig6o).
' See Letter From John Natteford, Adoptions Supervisor, Department of Social
Welfare, Ventura, Cal., to Child Welfare, in Child Welfare, Nov. 1961, p. 30; Letter
From Thomas J. S. Waxter, Director of the Maryland Department of Public Wel-
fare, to Child Welfare, in Child Welfare, Sept. ig6i, p. 2g; Letter From Katherine
B. Wheeler, Supervisor of Adoption, Iowa Children's Home Society, to Child Wel-
fare, in 41 C w WatZ.x 270 (1962).
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into his new family (p. 173). Most applicants for children want young
babies. An infant has been found to make an easier adjustment to a
new environment and family than an older child, with the result that
favorable family relationships are more likely to develop (pp. 189, 435).
Furthermore, it appears that if an unwed mother has received counseling
before the birth of the child and has made a decision to give up the child,
the immediate removal of the child after birth may minimize the emo-
tional damage to the mother (pp. z89-95).
Termination of the strong natural ties between children and parents is
probably rarely accomplished completely, particularly in children who
have seen and known their parents. It has been shown that children in
this category are conscious of the origin of their birth and think, speak,
ask and often fantasize about the identity or whereabouts of their bio-
logical parents (pp. 135-43, 144-54, 48o-8i). Courts may sever the
legal implications of the biological parent-child relationship, but they
cannot break the psychological ties. For this reason, "termination," a
term used in legislation and by judges and frequently used in the
Readings, is not an accurate description of what is occurring in the
"termination proceedings." When a child is taken from his biological
parents and adopted by another set, his family has been "reorganized." •
A major problem in the field of adoption is establishing the criteria
for "terminating" the legal implications of the parent-child relationship
during the child's infancy, thus making the child available for adoption.
Traditionally, the emphasis has been on parental "unfitness" which,
according to present-day doctrine, manifests itself in various ways:
abandonment of parental responsibilities, drunkenness, commitment to
a mental institution, imprisonment under certain circumstances, im-
morality, being adjudicated the "guilty" party in a divorce suit, and
causing children to be neglected. 5
Each of these examples of "unfitness" raises serious questions regard-
ing its detrimental effects on the child -presumably the test to be
applied - and its clarity as a useful standard. Illustrative of the latter
point is "neglect."
There has been a great deal of concern lately whether legal definitions
of neglect are broad enough to include both the physical and emotional
aspects of the concept. Presumably the distinction is valuable in deter-
mining the proper disposition of a "neglected" child. For example, Miss
Smith states that "in the past emphasis was on physical neglect in
deciding that children needed to be removed from their families" (p. 5).
However, she says that the current practice is to keep the physically
neglected child in his home but to remove the emotionally neglected.
The theory is that by giving the parents sufficient supportive help, "they
can maintain their home without having their children suffer in their
physical development. This enables the parents to continue providing
4This analysis and terminology is developed in KATZ & G0LDSTEIN THE FAmiLY
AND Ti LAW (presently at press).
5 See Katz, Judicial and Statutory Trends in the Law, )f A4doption , GEo. L.J.64, 77-87 (1962); Comment 24 RocKY MT. L. REv. 3Q, 3t-2 61 (IY,2)
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for their children's emotional needs so essential to the child's total well-
being" (pp. 5-6).
There is a question whether this approach is not itself an over-
reaction. Physical and emotional neglect are not mutually exclusive:
they are intimately connected. Recent studies on child neglect point
up the fact that a whole range of deprivations can flow from a single
parental act.6 Young lists a series of cruel and abusive acts parents, in
different social settings and with different behavior patterns, perform
and shows how the effects of these acts are manifested by pathology in
the child: clearly defined emotional problems, delinquency, and so forth.
Riese's study perhaps more clearly illustrates the full impact of severe
parental deprivations on a child's emotional, intellectual and moral
development. It is much too general to write of "neglect" as Miss Smith
does. The effects of any one kind are multiple; the abuses range in
degree and kind; the settings in which the neglecting conduct occurs
and the personalities of the erring parents vary. All these factors are
important in determining the appropriate disposition of the child.
All the writers treat adoption as if it were a singularly unique disposi-
tion and thus inordinately restrict problems of child placement. No
mention is made of the relevancy of their material to custody decrees in
divorce and separation proceedings. The authors, like the courts, either
assume or hope that the traditional categories of "adoption," "foster
care," "institutionalization," and "protective services" 7 are distinct. In
fact they are not. They are all intended to make permanent structural
changes in the child's original family. They all provide the child with
a new family unit. Perhaps this is less obvious in protective services.
However, if the services are successful, a change in parental behavior
might provide the child and his parents with different attitudes toward
each other. In this way it is likely that even though the persons are
the same, their relationship is different.
Characteristics of the categories overlap. Similarities are more fre-
quent than differences. Save for protective services, the dispositions
mentioned above all involve the physical removal of a child from his
biological parents and his placement with others. Even if not so designed
(as in foster care or institutionalization), any of the placements may be
permanent. In all of the dispositions, except institutionalization, it is
not uncommon for the custodian (whether biological, foster or adoptive
parent) or child to receive social or psychiatric services (pp. 59, 87, 95,
104, 155, 323, 332). In any of the dispositions a child might have some
association with his biological parents or relatives. The relationship is
obvious while a child is in the custody of his biological parents; it is
6 RIEsE, HEAL THE HURT CHILD (z962); YOUNG, WEDNESDAY'S CUMDREN (1964).
'Protective services are utilized when it is thought that the parents can be
rehabilitated without removing their children from their custody. Social workers,
under state authority, go directly to the homes of the neglecting parents in an
effort to change attitudes and behavior "so that warmer, happier and more secure
bonds are formed between the parents as individuals and their children, so that
improvement is brought about in the physical and environmental side of their
home life." De Francis, Child Protective Services in the United States ii (1956).
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encouraged when he is in foster care 8 or institutionalized.9 The associa-
tion may result in adoption because of the legal implications flowing
from the adoptive status (e.g., rights of inheritance available in sofne
states), or perhaps because the identity of the biological parents is well
known (e.g., in relative adoptions). Finally, in each of the dispositions,
whether imposed by law or contract, the custodian has a duty to feed,
shelter, educate, supervise and provide medical care for his child. The
traditional categories thus are not useful for purposes of determining
custodial dispositions.
When faced with the problem of judicial disposition of a neglected
child, the questions should not be: should the child be removed from
his biological parents? should protective services be invoked? should the
child be placed in foster care, institutionalized, or put up for adoption?
The striking similarity in characteristics of the categories noted above
illustrates the limitations of this line of questioning. The question
should be: which, among given alternatives, is the best family unit
(regardless of the label attacked) for the child?
All the authors agree that adoption placements should be in "the best
interests of the child." They labor under a variety of indices of what is
and what is not "in the child's best interests." For example, one writer
states that relevant factors for good adoptive placement include "the
capacity of adoptive parents for giving love and receiving love, for
exercising parental responsibility" (p. 29), but he excludes wealth and
status. Another enumerates minimum standards for determining a
custodian: "physical fitness, absence of gross mental disease, some
measure of economic security, and an adequate social and community
adjustment" (p. 78). She excludes as "grossly improper motives" those
"connected with the inheritance of property or the fulfilling of the
conditions of a will . . . . [or] to patch up a crumbling marriage"
(ibid.).
The question that must be asked is how do these indices relate to the
best interests of the child. Why, for example, is giving love and receiving
love relevant to the best interests of the child and wealth and status
not, or why is the fact that the custodian has made "an adequate social
and community adjustment" relevant and desire to have an heir not? It
seems that the authors sidestep the crucial problem: defining "the best
interests of the child." Unless the concept is sufficiently clarified, the
indices have no point of reference.
One way of defining "the best interests of the child" is to approach it
in two steps: (i) to spell out a comprehensive scheme, perhaps in terms
of certain value categories (e.g., well-being, affection, enlightenment,
wealth, skill, respect, and power); 10 (2) to indicate precisely how the
goals in each value category can be implemented. For example, suppose
under the value category "well-being" (defined as events concerning
physical and emotional safety, health, and comfort), the goal is to pro-
8 See WEiNSTEI, THE SELf-ImAGE Or THE FOSTER CHMD 13, 14 (ig6o).
'See FREuD & BURL N HAM, IN-FANTS WrrHoUT FAm-.IES (I014).10 See Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 236 (1943).
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mote the healthy maturity of a child. Once that is articulated, the
second step would be to determine what factors are relevant in reaching
that goal. One might be, as suggested by Clothier, the importance of
placement with two parental figures, male and female, rather than with
a single custodian, so that the child will "attain . . . psychosexual
maturity" (p. 79). Others might be the need for the custodian to pro-
vide stimulation and affection, or for maintaining a continuous relation-
ship with an adult (p. 172), or, .when in issue, for placing siblings to-
gether (p. 176). With this two-step analysis, it would be possible to
descend from the glib abstraction of "the best interests of the child"
to a more meaningful and workable concept. This analysis would better
serve to aid predictability in child disposition cases than the almost
ad hoc approach presently taken. My major criticism of Miss Smith's
collection is that it does not reflect the broad conceptual analysis that
seems needed.
Even discussions about the contribution of other professions seem
limited. Surely the lawyer's role in the adoption process is broader than
the formalistic conception social workers have of it (p. 393) - a concep-
tion that seems to have influenced the lawyer's own views. The
lawyer's role must not be restricted to counseling clients about the legal
aspects of adoption, encouraging them to utilize licensed child-placement
agencies and "bring [ing] about hopefully an adoption decree which will
withstand attack" (p. 467). This rigid view of the lawyer's function
hopelessly cripples at the outset any attempt to view adoption problems
contextually. The lawyer has a role to play for each of the many
participants in the adoption process (e.g., he may be counsel for
the biological parents, child, adoptive couple, agency, or foster parents)
and in various stages of that process."-
It was Miss Smith's hope that her collection would be "helpful in
providing a groundwork of knowledge on which to base future planning
and policies" (p. xi). I think many of the selections fall short of this
goal, particularly because they lack the comprehensive analysis basic to
a broad conceptual framework. Miss Smith realizes that "it is impossible
for any collection of articles at a given time to represent completely all
the latest ideas on adoption" (p. xi). This, of course, is true. How-
ever, until the problems discussed in these essays are properly structured,
we cannot expect any significant breakthrough in solving the problems
in the judicial disposition of children.
SANFORD N. KATZ *
x See Katz, Community Decision-Makers and the Promotion of Values in the
Adoption of Children, 38 Tnx Soci.L SERvicE REv. 26, 30-35 (1964).
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Florida.
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